THE MYTH OF PERFORMANCE FUNDING IN HIGHER EDUCATION

Gary L. Bridges and Peter Billington,University of Southern Colorado
2200 Bonforte Blvd. Pueblo, CO 81001 (719) 549-2030

Presented at the Western Decision Sciences Institute Twenty-Ninth Annual Meeting
April 18-22, 2000 Island of Maui, Hawaii

ABSTRACT

This paper summarizes my Ph.D. dissertation research, which addressed the following questions (among others): What changes might enhance future performance funding efforts in Colorado? Did the use of performance funding improve higher education performance or productivity in Colorado? Is performance funding the most appropriate vehicle to carry the quality improvement and accountability banners? My research indicates that much more work needs to be done to help states more fully understand the many variables of higher education quality and productivity before they embrace performance funding. I have summarized recommendations on how Colorado might improve its performance funding model.


COLORADO AND PERFORMANCE FUNDING

Colorado’s first attempt at performance funding was legislated in House Bill (HB) 94-1110, which was funded for only three of the five years it was in effect. The Colorado Commission on Higher Education (CCHE) collected data from higher education institutions and their governing boards during the fiscal years 1994-95 to 1997-98, which they used to make funding allocation decisions. HB 96-1219, the "Higher Education Quality Assurance Act", represented the second step toward a quality-enhancing (although unfunded) budgeting formula for Colorado’s higher education sector. Current legislation is embodied in HB 99-1289, which mandates a two-year study of the "…performance of the state system of higher education…including the criteria for measuring achievement of the indicators and the method of allocating funds as incentives for achievement." Colorado Senate Bill (SB) 99-229 superseded HB 96-1219 and established a new set of performance indicators (although some do overlap with those in HB 96-1219).

Colorado’s 1999-2000 Performance Indicators

Graduation Rates and Credits for Degree (four-year institutions).

Graduation Rates and Credits for Certificate or Degree (two-year institutions).

Faculty Instructional Productivity.

Freshmen Persistence

Achievement Rates

Lower Division Class Size

Approved and Implemented Diversity Plan

Institutional Support Costs


FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Finding: Mis-Directed Performance Funding

Performance funding policy did not require that the higher education governing boards forward the performance funding amounts to their respective institutions even though it was the institutional performance that drove the performance funding allocations. Institutions and their faculty and staff, who are the true change agents for many of the performance measures used, were left out of the funding process. It is likely that the governance structure and the faculty compensation system in place at most higher education institutions (including Colorado’s) impede change in educational practices in response to performance funding. Faculty are organized into individual departments, housed within separate schools and colleges. As states try to use performance funding to influence the behavior of higher education institutions, they run the risk of sending confusing and mixed messages to faculty, whose reward systems do not yet reflect the use of performance indicators.


Recommendation

Establish a mechanism whereby performance funding flows through the governing boards and institutions and to the schools, colleges, and department levels where it can directly affect faculty and staff.


Finding: Insufficient Funding Amounts

Colorado’s performance funding was considerably short of the 2 – 5 % of base funding that experts recommend.


Recommendation

The state of Colorado could match the amounts that institutions shifted from their base budgets. If the state allowed the institutions three to five years to incrementally allocate a portion of their base budgets to performance funding and matched that amount with new funding (within legal restrictions), the state and the institutions would be partners.


Finding: Discontinuity of the Funding

The Colorado State legislature discontinued the funding for the performance indicators while the legislation was still in effect.


Recommendation

State legislatures, in concert with governing boards and higher education leadership, should establish a long-term agenda, complete with an evaluation timetable, and maintain consistent funding. Otherwise, performance funding policies will have little effect and it will be difficult, if not impossible, to measure their effectiveness.


Finding: Discontinuity of the Criteria

The Colorado Commission on Higher Education (CCHE) modified many of the performance indicators during the period the legislation was in effect. They made the adjustments in an attempt to achieve more meaningful results, but made it very difficult to analyze the results. Without understanding how of if performance funding affects higher education’s performance, policymakers cannot know whether to continue the policies or how to modify them to better meet state goals. Faculty and administrators may also become confused about what the state’s goals are if the performance measures are not consistent.


Recommendation

State legislatures should make every attempt to ensure that coordinating agencies and governing boards make minimal changes to performance indicators. Of course, there may be need to adjust how performance data is collected or how performance indicators are measured.


Finding: Research Institutions Behave Differently

The three institutions classified by CCHE as "Research I" universities (Colorado School of Mines, University of Colorado at Boulder, and Colorado State University) admitted higher-achieving students (as evidenced by index scores [ACT plus high school GPA/class standing]), delivered education differently, and paid significantly higher faculty salaries.

One key measure of learning incorporated in the performance indicators was students’ performance on the Graduate Record Examination (GRE). Statistical analysis indicated that almost 70% of the variation in students’ GRE scores could be attributed to students’ ACT scores. Yet, the state’s performance funding model rewarded higher or improving GRE scores equally for all institutions. Analysis also indicated that research institutions attracted higher-achieving students (as measured by ACT scores) thereby allowing those institutions to reap the rewards of the performance-funding model simply because of the type of students they served.


Recommendation

Structure the performance-funding model so that it distinguishes between research and non-research institutions.

Reward institutions whose incoming students achieve ACT scores above a certain level differently for their outgoing students’ achievement (GRE, etc.) scores.

Weight performance indicators by their importance to specific institutions.

Base performance funding for test scores on improvement from a pre-specified base level or benchmark.


Finding: No correlation Between Funding and Performance

Statistical analysis indicated no significant relationships between performance funding dollars allocated and subsequent higher education performance indicators in Colorado. In other words, the performance funding had no effect on higher education performance as measured by the CCHE.

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